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1. Introduction
Asymmetric information has long been recognised as a key problem in financial markets (Stiglitz &
Weiss, 1981; de Meza & Webb, 1987). There are several means by which outside investors can
mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric information: ex ante monitoring (Broecker, 1990),
interim and ex post monitoring (Holmström & Tirole, 1997; Diamond, 1984), collateral
requirements (Bester, 1985) and long-term lending relationships (von Thadden, 1995).1 It is widely
felt that the need for such things in the credit markets can explain the existence of financial
intermediaries. The analysis is extended in this paper, which explores how making benchmarks and
comparisons of potential investment projects can help to mitigate - even eliminate - the asymmetric
information problem in financial markets, and how this benefit of benchmarking is conducive to
centralised financial intermediation.
To conduct ex ante monitoring properly, outside investors ought to gather
comprehensive information on each entrepreneur or firm applying for funding and on their projects.
For example, the skills and experience of the entrepreneur or firm's management, the quality of the
business plan, the tangible and intangible assets, the market potential of the products, and the cost
efficiency should all be examined in detail. Based on this information, investors can evaluate the
expected returns of the proposed project and provide finance at appropriate (risk-based) pricing. It
is, however, not easy to assess expected returns precisely or to price risks correctly. In particular, in
new markets where investors have little, or no, prior experience and entrepreneurs' assets are
intangible, it is virtually impossible to make precise evaluations. In more familiar sectors, finance
for new entrepreneurs with no track record is difficult to price. Even if entrepreneurs or firms
seeking outside finance are well known to the investors, changes in the economic environment may
hamper the rating of applicants and hence their funding.
1 Freixas & Rochet (1997) and Gorton & Winton (2003) provide thorough surveys of this literature.
1In this paper we argue that investors can overcome the difficulties in ex ante
monitoring by making benchmarks and comparisons. Although incomplete information problems in
funding entrepreneurs and their projects relate to individual characteristics, learning from other
entrepreneurs' projects can help to uncover the true distribution of project characteristics in the
economy. As a result, investors can compare and rank the projects and choose the very best. These
projects will succeed with above-average probability. Hence by making benchmarks and
comparisons, investors gather valuable information and thereby boost their investment yields.
Moreover, if an investor compares sufficiently many entrepreneurs, the incomplete information
problem will be eliminated with certainty.
As  an  example,  consider  10 de novo entrepreneurs from the same narrow high-tech
sector. Such entrepreneurs typically have fresh prototype products, their primary assets consist of
human capital and intellectual property rights, and they lack funds for the investments required to
commercialise the prototypes. Any outside investor will certainly find it a demanding task to assess
the value of a prototype, its expected sales revenues, marketing strategy and ability of
entrepreneurs, and so on. However, if the investor would contact each of the 10 firms and
investigate their prototypes, intellectual property portfolios, and entrepreneurial talent and then
compare these, she may discover crucial differences between entrepreneurs' business plans. The
investor can rank the entrepreneurs and finance only the best ones. As a result, the investor can be
quite confident that the best entrepreneurs' products and plans are of sufficiently high quality that
the entrepreneurs will be able to repay the funding.
To benefit from the creation of benchmarks and rankings, however, an outside
investor needs to evaluate numerous entrepreneurs, even if she can finance only one. With multiple
investors operating in isolation, each entrepreneur is evaluated and compared several times. This
duplicates the costs of information gathering. Wasteful duplication could be avoided if the investors
joined together to establish a financial intermediary, which would evaluate each loan applicant,
2compare and rank them, and finance only the best ones. Each applicant is evaluated only once, and
inefficient duplication is eliminated. Consequently, the possibility to make benchmarks and
comparisons creates a novel rationale for centralised financial intermediation and delegated
information gathering. In this respect our paper is related to the literature on the role of information
provision in explaining financial intermediaries. Beyond the seminal contribution by Leland and
Pyle (1977), our argument is closely related those of Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan & Thakor
(1984), and Boyd & Prescott (1986). As in these papers, a major advantage of forming a financial
intermediary in our model is to reduce monitoring costs. Another advantage is information
production in the sprit of Ramakrishnan & Thakor (1984) and Boyd & Prescott (1986). Finally, our
intermediary engages in asset transformation as in Diamond (1984) and Boyd & Prescott (1986).
Our work thus adds to the long string of literature that extends the basic insights on financial
intermediaries as delegated monitors and information gatherers into various dimensions (see, e.g.
Krasa & Villamil, 1992, Winton, 1995, Cerasi & Daltung, 2000, Hellwig, 2000, and Niinimäki,
2001).
Although the intermediary emerging from our analysis is bank-like and we treat
entrepreneurs seeking outside finance as loan applicants, most of the analysis deals with a single
investor and needs not specify the form of the financial contract. Moreover, the benefits of
benchmarking are most evident in the finance of new ideas in new markets, where debt contracts
are less predominant. Our paper therefore touches the literature on entities that finance innovation
such as private equity and venture capitalists (for an authoritative survey of venture capital finance,
see Gompers & Lerner, 2004). In particular, our study sheds light on the question of why and how
venture capitalists benchmark their projects as in Bergemann & Hege (2002). In contrast to
Bergemann & Hege (2002), which emphasises the value of benchmarking and staggered project
3finance in alleviating moral hazard, project comparison in our model provides benchmarks that
mitigate the hidden information problem.2
Another connection with the works of Bergeman & Hege (1998, 2002) is that making
benchmarks and comparisons can be seen as a special form of costly learning or experimentation in
financial markets.3 Although benchmarks and comparisons provide information, they are costly to
make, since an investor must monitor numerous entrepreneurs to gather information. Thus the
investor has to weigh the opportunity cost of monitoring yet one entrepreneur against the future
informational benefits, as in the theory of experimentation. The key difference versus the learning
and experimentation literature is that information derived from making benchmarks and
comparisons exploits the differences between entrepreneurs and does not require observations on
the same entrepreneur over time. Indeed, in our model no additional information is gained by
observing the same entrepreneur more than once.
2 For benchmarking, see also Siems & Barr (1998), Balk (2003) and Courty & Marschke (2004).
3 For experimentation and costly learning during long-term lending relationships, see Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden
(2004). In these papers, borrower types are unobservable. A bank learns the borrower types by lending to borrowers and
by monitoring them during the lending relationships. As a result, the bank has information advantage regarding its
existing borrowers against outside banks. In some cases, banks optimally share borrower specific information among
themselves (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993). In practice, learning by lending is strongly utilized in credit scoring programs
(see Thomas, 2000; Berger & Frame & Miller, 2005, and Blochlinger & Leippold, 2006). Using a statistical program, a
bank compares the information of a loan applicant to the credit performance of former borrowers with similar profiles.
A credit scoring program awards points for each factor that helps predict who is likely to pay back a loan. A total
number of points – a credit score – helps evaluate how creditworthy a loan applicant is. Hence, credit scoring programs
offer an important instrument to handle information within banks. Since the quality of the credit scoring system is
increasing in the number of former borrowers, the programs may generate information-releted economics of scale in
banking. Additionally, established banks with credit scoring programs may have information advantage against de novo
banks. Benchmarks and comparisons complete information that can be obtained using credit scoring.
4Since the problem of asymmetric information and alternative suggestions to eliminate
it play important roles in the theory of finance, we have mostly considered our analysis from this
point  of  view:  a  loan  applicant  knows  the  type  of  his  project,  but  the  type  is  unobservable  to
investors. Alternatively, in our framework it is possible to assume that neither the loan applicant nor
the investors know the quality of the project. Each entrepreneur will always search finance for his
project since the project incurs no costs to him. Whether or not the loan applicant knows the quality
of his project, he will always search for finance and the investors aim to evaluate the project
quality.4
The paper is organised as follows. In sections 2-3 we develop the main ideas and
present the costs and benefits of comparing using a simple model with one investor and at most two
entrepreneurs. In section 4 we consider a more general environment where the number of potential
entrepreneurs can increase without bound. In section 5 we allow for multiple investors and show
how comparing can explain the existence of financial intermediaries. Section 6 concludes.
4 We will thank anonymous referees who highlighted the point “it is possible to assume that neither the loan applicant
nor the investors know the quality of the project” to us.
52. The economy
2.1 Financial market participants
In the basic model there are, +Î ZN , risk-neutral entrepreneurs (= loan applicants) and one risk-
neutral investor. In section 5 we allow for multiple investors. The entrepreneurs lack funds, but each
has a project that requires a fixed start-up investment of unit size. The funding can be obtained from
the investor (she), who has a unit of capital but no project of her own. The project of an
entrepreneur (he) is good with probability g  and bad with probability g-1 . Project quality is
unobservable to outsiders and, without risk of confusion, we refer to good and bad entrepreneurs. A
good project yields a transferable income Y  with certainty, and a bad project only generates a non-
transferable private benefit B to the entrepreneur.
We assume that contacting an entrepreneur is costly. This cost, denoted by c, includes,
e.g., the costs of waiting or searching for an entrepreneur, evaluating and monitoring his project,
making the funding decision, and writing the funding contract or informing of the rejection of
funding application. The cost occurs when the investor contacts and monitors an entrepreneur, and
it cannot be avoided. A contact provides an informative signal about the entrepreneur's type, which
will be specified in the next subsection.5
Since there is only one investor we assume that the investor has full bargaining power.
Besides  simplifying  the  analysis,  the  assumption  is  convenient  when we look  more  closely  at  the
benefits of centralised financial intermediation with multiple investors in section 5, since the
5 Although we believe that unavoidable contacting and monitoring costs are empirically relevant, the assumption is
essentially a short-cut. We could have regarded c as a signal extraction expense and assumed that it can be avoided but
only  at  the  cost  of  not  receiving  the  signal.  This  would  have  complicated  the  analysis  by  adding  one  layer  to  the
decision problem of the investor.
6assumption implies that investors have no incentive to form a financial intermediary to gain market
power. The assumption also means that the form of financial contract is indeterminate: the investor
can seize the entire output of a good project, Y, by driving the entrepreneur to the zero profit level.
It is assumed that 0>-- crY  where 1³r  denotes the economy's risk-free interest rate (investor's
opportunity  cost).  Hence  a  good  project  has  a  positive  net  present  value.  In  contrast,  a  bad
entrepreneur is assumed to have a project with negative net present value, i.e., 0<- rB .6
2.2 Signals
Upon contacting an entrepreneur, the investor receives a signal on the entrepreneur's type. Each
signal is informative in itself but, more importantly, they can be used as a benchmark with which
subsequent signals will be compared. The signal can originate from any information reflecting
profitability of the entrepreneur's project. For brevity, we assume the signal can take only three
values: 321 and,, sss  where 321 sss >> . Besides entrepreneur's type, the value of a signal
depends on the state of the world:
· With probability h , the state of the world is high, in which case a good entrepreneur’s signal
is invariably 1s  and a bad entrepreneur’s signal is invariably 2s .
· With probability 1-h,  the  state  of  the  world  is low, in which case a good entrepreneur’s
signal is invariably 2s  and a bad entrepreneur’s signal 3s .
Then, on average, the value of a signal is larger in a high state of the world than in a low state of the
world. For simplicity, we do not allow the state of the world to affect the project return but only the
6 Strictly speaking we do not need the assumption that B<r, but it is more appropriate to label entrepreneurs bad if their
projects have negative net present value.
7value of the signal. Because the investor cannot receive the signal 3s  from a good entrepreneur and
the signal 1s from a bad entrepreneur, the signals 1s  and 3s are perfectly informative in that they
fully reveal both the state of the world and type of loan applicant. Signal 1s  tells the investor that
the state of the world is high and the entrepreneur is good. Similarly, signal 3s  says that the state of
the world is low and the entrepreneur is bad. After observing either 1s  or 3s , the investor operates
under perfect information.
Signal 2s  is more interesting. It indicates a bad entrepreneur in a high state of the
world or a good one in a low state. Although the investor can use the signal 2s  to update her prior
beliefs about the state of the world and entrepreneur's type, incomplete information remains after
observing such a signal. After observing 2s  from the first loan applicant, the investor must accept
or reject the application without knowing the entrepreneur's type, or she can use the first signal as a
benchmark and gather more information by contacting another entrepreneur and comparing him
with the benchmark. If the second signal is 1s , the comparison of 1s  with the benchmark 2s  reveals
that the state of the world is necessarily high and that the first entrepreneur is bad and the second is
good. If the second signal is 3s , the investor learns that the state of the world is low, the first
entrepreneur is good and the second is bad.
If the investor receives 2s  from the second applicant, we still have incomplete
information. However, even in this case, seeking a second loan applicant and comparing with the
benchmark yields useful information, since the investor can update her beliefs about the state of the
world and entrepreneur's type. Thus, although the investor still must make a lending decision under
incomplete information, she is better informed.
Note that it is optimal to contact the loan applicants sequentially since this ensures that
each contact provides some useful information and no costs of contacting are wasted. Since
contacting a new loan applicant is costly, the investor encounters an optimal stopping problem each
8time she receives the signal 2s . We nonetheless assume for brevity that the contacts take place fast
enough so that the state of the world remains unchanged and that previous contacts can be recalled.
As a result,  if  the first  signal is 2s  but the second is 3s , the investor optimally returns to the first
entrepreneur and grants him a loan.
In sum, the signalling technology is simple: there are only three signals and they are
informative. Two of the signals are actually very informative: good and bad signals perfectly reveal
the borrower type. Despite this simple signalling technology, it is more informative to compare
several entrepreneurs than just to observe the same entrepreneur over time, since the signals can
vary according to the state of the world. Subsection 3.4 cites examples where signals depend on the
state of the world.
2.3 The timing of events
The investor's decision problem has two stages. In the first stage, the investor who may have
contacted some entrepreneurs previously faces three options. First, she can exit the credit market
without lending to anyone. Second, she can grant a loan to any of entrepreneurs she has contacted
previously. Finally, she can pool the previous signals with her prior to form a benchmark and invest
c to acquire more information by comparing a new loan applicant with the benchmark. In the
second stage, the investor will collect her payoffs from exit or lending decisions.. In case the
investor decides to contact a new entrepreneur, she will receive a signal on the entrepreneur's type
and updates her belief about the entrepreneur's type and the state of the world. In this case the
investor again faces the aforementioned three options.
93. Benchmarking and comparing with two loan applicants
In this section, we first consider a loan market with perfect information. We then further develop
concepts in the context of a simple example where there is only one loan applicant in the economy.
Finally, we introduce a second loan applicant to demonstrate the value of benchmarking..
3.1 Perfect information
Under perfect information the investor can separate good from bad firms and grant a loan to a good
one. We assume that under perfect information, lending is profitable to the investor, i.e.,
0)( >-- crYg . (1)
As explained, g in (1) is the probability of contacting a good entrepreneur. In such case the investor
can reap the entire output of the project, Y ; r denotes the opportunity cost of invested capital and c
the cost of a contact. Suppose first that the economy has only one entrepreneur, who is contacted by
the investor. With probability g, the investor learns that the entrepreneur represents a good type.
The investor finances the project and makes profit crY -- , since a good project always succeeds.
With probability 1-g, the  entrepreneur  proves  to  be  bad.  The  investor  does  not  lend  to  him.  In
contrast, the investor invests his endowment at the risk-free interest rate of the economy and bears
the cost of contacting. Thus, the investor’s returns are c- . In sum, with probability g  the investor
makes profits crY --  and with probability 1-g she loses c- . The expected returns of the investor
amount to 0)( >-- crYg , which is positive owing to (1).
Suppose now that the investor can contact numerous entrepreneurs until a good
entrepreneur appears. The expected value of the each contact is 0)( >-- crYg  to  her.  If  the
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economy has n   entrepreneurs, the investor’s expected profits amount to [ ] +-- crYg )(
[ ] +--- crYgg )()1( [ ] ....)()1( 2 +---+ crYgg .  , which is equal to
[ ]
g
crYgg n ---- )()1(1 .
This is always positive when (1) is satisfied.
3.2 Incomplete information with one loan applicant
If the economy consists of just one entrepreneur, the investor has to decide first whether to incur c
and contact the entrepreneur and then whether to grant a loan to the entrepreneur given her updated
belief about the entrepreneur's type. With probability hg, the signal is 1s . With this signal, the
investor knows that the entrepreneur is good and she grants him a loan. With probability (1-h)(1-g)
the signal is 3s  and the investor knows that the entrepreneur is bad and she does not grant a loan.
With probability h(1-g)+(1-h)g the signal is 2s  and the investor can update her belief about
entrepreneur's  type,  but  incomplete  information  remains.  In  such  a  case,  the  investor  may or  may
not grant a loan in the presence of uncertainty about the type of entrepreneur. Thus the value of a
loan to the investor with one entrepreneur in the economy is given by
( ) [ ]{ }0,)()1()1(max 21 csvghghrYhgV RN --+-+-== (2)
where subscript N=1 of V is the number of entrepreneurs in the economy and
( ) { }0,)(max 22 rYsgpsvR -= (3)
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is the value of a loan under uncertainty, given the signal 2s . In (3)
ghgh
ghsgp
)1()1(
)1()( 2 -+-
-
= (4)
is the conditional probability that signal 2s  indicates a good entrepreneur. As (3) shows, ( )2svR  is
positive since the investor finances a project only if its expected NPV is positive. Note that the
positive value of ( )2svR  has nothing to do with limited liability, which plays no role in this context
since the investor uses only her own funds. Similarly, the value of a loan given by (2) is positive
since the investor contacts the entrepreneur only if it is profitable. From (1) and (2) it is clear that
incomplete information reduces the value of the lending opportunity: with perfect information the
investor never needs to risk of losing her capital (r) whereas with incompelete information the
investor takes such risk when the first signal is 2s  and ( )2svR  is strictly positive.
3.3 Incomplete information with two loan applicants
With two entrepreneurs, the investor must first decide whether to contact either of the
entrepreneurs. If she contacts one of them, she has to decide whether to grant a loan to him or use
him as a benchmark. By creating the benchmark the investor can contact a second entrepreneur and
compare him with the benchmark. Then the investor must decide whether to grant a loan to either or
neither of the two entrepreneurs. Since the investor has only one unit of capital, he can not finance
12
both projects even when both of them are good.7 If the first signal is either 1s  or 3s , the investor's
decision problem is straightforward so we first characterise them.
The first signal is 1s . If the signal from the first entrepreneur is 1s , the investor knows
that he is good. Since the investor has only one unit of capital, there is no need to contact the second
entrepreneur, and the investor grants a loan to the first entrepreneur, which yields rY -  with
certainty.
The first signal is 3s . If the signal received upon contacting the first entrepreneur is
3s , the entrepreneur is bad with certainty. If the second contact also yields 3s , the investor does not
lend. If the second signal is 2s , the investor can eliminate the incomplete information problem by
comparing signals. Because the first signal, 3s , reveals that the state of the world is low, the second
entrepreneur with 2s  must be a worthy borrower. Since the probability that the second entrepreneur
emits 2s  is g, the value of a loan when 3s  is the first signal is given by
( ) { }0,)(max3 crYgsv --= . As crYg -- )( >0 by (1), we obtain
( ) 0)(3 >--= crYgsv . (5)
Note that the value of a loan stems entirely from the possibility of comparing the entrepreneurs.
The first signal is 2s . In this case the investor's problem is more complicated. If the
second signal is also 2s , the investor cannot be sure about the entrepreneurs' type and can only
update her beliefs. The value of a loan under uncertainty when both signals are 2s  is given by
7 By assuming that an investor has only a unit of capital in this section, we will emphasise that the investor's sole reason
to contact numerous entrepreneurs is to gather more information. As a result, it is possible to explore optimal stopping
in information gathering. The analysis is extended in section 5, where the economy has numerous investors and
entrepreneurs. All good projects are then financed. Thus, there is no credit rationing.
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( ) ( ){ }0,,max, 2222 rYssgpssvR -= (6)
where, analogously to (4),
( ) 22
2
22 )1()1(
)1(,
ghgh
ghssgp
-+-
-
= (7)
is the conditional probability that signal 2s  indicates a good entrepreneur after two observations.
Again, ( )22 , ssvR  is positive since the investor finances a project only if its NPV is positive.
If the signal received from the second entrepreneur is 1s , the investor knows that she
is dealing with a good entrepreneur and grants a loan. If the second contact yields 3s , the investor
knows that the state is low, the entrepreneur is bad and the first entrepreneur is good. The investor
thus grants a loan to the first entrepreneur. When the first signal is 2s , the value of a loan can be
written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,,1,max 222222 cssvtrYtsvsv RR --+-= . (8)
where ( ) ( )[ ]( )gshpgshpt --+= 11 222  is the probability that incomplete information can be
eliminated by using the second signal. Here
( ) ( )22 1)1()1(
)1( sgp
ghgh
ghshp -=
-+-
-
= (9)
14
is the conditional probability that the state is high when the investor observes signal 2s . As it
stands, (8) shows the three choices faced by the investor after observing 2s  from the first contact.
First, if ( ) 02 <- rYsgp  implying ,0)( 2 =svR and if ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,1 2222 <--+- cssvtrYt R , the
investor does not lend at all and v(s2)=0. That is, the investor can achieve zero returns by omitting
lending.8 Otherwise, the maximisation problem on the right-hand side of (8) reflects the investor's
choice of whether to contact the second entrepreneur. If the investor decides to grant a loan under
uncertainty after contacting only one entrepreneur, her expected payoff is given by ( )2svR . From (8)
we observe that the investor contacts the second entrepreneur if
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22222 ,1 svcssvtrYt RR +³-+- . (10)
In Appendix A we prove that the investor's optimal lending strategy after observing 2s satisfies the
following conditions:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the first loan applicant's type is unknown (signal 2s ). Then,
i) if the contacting cost (c) is sufficiently low, the investor contacts a second loan applicant and
compares him with the first one,
ii) if c is sufficiently high and if either the prior probability that a loan applicant has a good project
(g) is sufficiently high or if the prior probability of a high state (h) is sufficiently low to render the
net present value of a loan under uncertainty positive ( ( ) 02 >svR ), the investor grants a loan to the
first applicant.
iii) if c is sufficiently high and if either g is sufficiently low or h sufficiently high to render
( ) 02 £svR , the investor does not lend at all.
8 The investor can achieve zero returns, since the sunk costs of the first contact are not included in )( 2sv  and )( 3sv .
The sunk costs appear in (11).
15
The  LHS  of  (10)  shows  the  benefits  of  benchmarking:  with  positive  probability  ( )2t  the second
contact will probably eliminate the asymmetric information problem and, even if it does not, the
investor can gather more information by comparing entrepreneurs and updating her beliefs. The cost
of benchmarking is on the RHS of (10). Besides the cost of contacting, the opportunity cost of
benchmarking stems from the possibility to grant a loan under uncertainty about the type of the first
entrepreneur. For the case g>1/2, it  is  easy to see why part  i)  of Proposition 1 must be true,  since
then ( ) ( )222 , svssvrY RR ³>- , i.e., the payoff from benchmarking clearly exceeds the value of the
loan under uncertainty. But it turns out that the same conclusion holds even for g<1/2,  so  the
benefits exceed the cost of benchmarking when the cost of contacting is sufficiently low.
In the first case in Table 1 we give a numeric example where the investor optimally
creates a benchmark and compares entrepreneurs after receiving 2s  from the first contact. The
parameter values of interest are g=0.25, h=0.5, and c=0.1.9 If the first signal is 2s , the probability
that the signal indicates a good entrepreneur is relatively low (0.25) and a loan under uncertainty is
unprofitable. Instead, the investor uses 2s  as a benchmark and contacts a second entrepreneur. This
will eliminate incomplete information with probability 0.375. Although a loan remains unprofitable
if incomplete information is not eliminated, a low cost of contacting ( 1.0=c ) makes benchmarking
and contacting the second entrepreneur optimal.
As part ii) suggests, the investor may prefer to grant a loan under uncertainty about the
type of the first entrepreneur over using him as a benchmark if the cost of contacting is sufficiently
high. The strategy may also be optimal with moderate or even with low contacting cost if the first
entrepreneur, given signal 2s , is good with sufficiently high probability, that is, when g is close to
one or h is close to zero. In such circumstances, incomplete information causes a minor nuisance
and the expected benefits of benchmarking do not cover the cost of contacting.
9 In all numerical examples we hold Y at 2 and r at 1 and vary g, h, and c.
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A numerical example in which granting a loan under uncertainty about the type of the
first  entrepreneur  is  optimal  can  be  found in  Case  2  of  Table  1.  Here g=0.75, h=0.25, and c=0.5.
Because the priors of a good entrepreneur and a low state are high (both 0.75), the first entrepreneur
with 2s  is good with a high probability ( 9.0)( 2 =sgp ). Together with relatively costly contacting
(c=0.5) this makes contacting a second entrepreneur unprofitable.
Part iii) of Proposition 1 can also be seen from (10). The investor prefers not to lend at
all after signal 2s  if the expected return on a loan under uncertainty is not positive and the cost of
contacting is sufficiently high to render a search for a second entrepreneur unprofitable. This
possibility  is  illustrated  by  Case  3  of  Table  1,  with g=0.75, h=10/11, and c=0.65. Note that it is
profitable to contact a first entrepreneur but not a second one: The probability that incomplete
information will be eliminated by contacting the first entrepreneur is fairly high (hg+(1-h)(1-
g)»0.7). However, if incomplete information remains, the probability that the problem will be
eliminated by seeking a second entrepreneur is somewhat lower (below 0.64).
The value of a loan. We have above determined the conditional value of a loan for the
three possible values of the first signal. The initial value of a loan – the investor's expected return
before she has contacted either loan applicant – is then given by
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) csvghsvghghrYhgVN ---+-+-+-== )(11)(11 322 . (11)
In (11) )( 2sv  and )( 3sv  are given by (8) and (5), and they give the values of a loan to the investor
when the first signals are 2s  and 3s . The value of a loan after the investor receives signal 1s  from
the first entrepreneur is simply Y-r. These values of loans are weighted by the appropriate
probabilities: with probability hg the signal of the first entrepreneur is 1s , with
probability ( ) ( )[ ]ghgh -+- 11 the signal is s2, and with probability (1-h)(1-g) it is s3.
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That the investor's optimal strategy under incomplete information can involve
benchmarking can be seen from (11). After contacting the first entrepreneur, the investor can gather
more information by using the first signal as a benchmark, seeking a second entrepreneur and
comparing him with the benchmark. If the signal from the first entrepreneur is 'better' than the
signal of the second, the first proves to be worthy of finance and vice versa. If the received signals
are identical, the investor can update her prior beliefs on the state of the world and types of
entrepreneurs, but the incomplete information problem remains. The investor will create a
benchmark and search for a second entrepreneur if the benefits outweigh the opportunity costs of
doing so. If the cost of contacting is sufficiently large, the investor may want to grant a loan to the
first entrepreneur without benchmarking and comparing, although there is higher risk of credit loss
than for a loan under uncertainty after contacting the second entrepreneur. Alternatively, the
investor will not grant a loan at all. If VN=2?0 the loan market opens up. This occurs if c is not too
high. If VN=2?0, (1) also holds, but not necessarily vice versa.
We summarise the benefits of benchmarking based on the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 2. By using the first entrepreneur as a benchmark and comparing the second
entrepreneur with him, the investor can gather more information and raise the expected return on
her loan. If the signals received from the entrepreneurs differ, incomplete information is eliminated,
and the investor can grant the loan to the good entrepreneur. Even if both signals are the same ( 2s )
and incomplete information obtains, the investor can update prior beliefs on types of entrepreneurs.
We give an example of the last point – the benefits of benchmarking and comparing
when both signals are 2s  and the problem of incomplete information remains - in Case 4 of Table 1.
The parameter values are g=0.25, h=0.2, and c=0.1. Now monitoring is cheap and the investor
contacts the second entrepreneur even if lending to the first entrepreneur appeared to be profitable
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( 14.0)( 2 »- rYsgp ). Yet, the investor is no longer willing to grant a loan after receiving 2s  also
from the second entrepreneur ( 38.0¨),( 22 -»- rYssgp ). In other words, since both the state of the
world is likely to be low and average entrepreneur is likely to be bad, the investor interprets the first
2s  as indicating a good type with a relatively high probability ( 57.0)( 2 »sgp ). Upon observing a
second 2s , however, the investor begins to put more weight on the possibility that the state is high
and, consequently, on the possibility that an entrepreneur with 2s  represents a bad type
( 31.0),( 22 »ssgp ).
In spite of all the benefits of using the first entrepreneur as a benchmark, the investor’s
lending decision is still less efficient than under perfect information. From (1) and (11), we see that
four inefficiencies remain: i) The first entrepreneur is good, but his type is unobservable to the
investor because of signal 2s . The investor may waste resources by searching for a second
entrepreneur or she may inefficiently exit the credit markets; ii) The investor encounters two good
entrepreneurs, but the entrepreneurs’ types remain unobservable. If rYssgp <),( 22 , the investor
makes a mistake and denies a loan; iii) The investor contacts a bad entrepreneur who signals 2s  and
who inefficiently receives a loan, if c is sufficiently high and rYsgp >)( 22  (part ii) of Proposition
1); iv)The investor contacts two bad entrepreneurs with 2s ,  and  she  grants  a  loan  if
rYssgp >),( 222 .
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Table 1. Four numerical examples with N=2, Y=2,and r=1.
CASE 1
g=1/4;h=1/2;c=1/10
CASE 2
g=3/4;h=1/4;c=1/2
CASE 3
g=3/4;h=10/11;c=65/100
CASE 4
g=1/4;h=1/5;c=1/10
0.25 0.9 0.23077 0.57143
0 0.8 0 0.14286
0.15 0.25 0.1 0.15
0.1 0.96429 0.47368 0.30769
0 0.92857 0 0
0.375 0.3 0.63462 0.53571
0.275 0.8 0 0.43571
0.21875 0.23438 0.03409 0.1925
3.4 Discussion
The model with one investor, two entrepreneurs, and three signals is admittedly limited. In the
subsequent sections we will allow for multiple entrepreneurs and financiers. While the extension of
the model to arbitrary number of signals is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the basic
insight about the value of making benchmarks and comparisons would not change in so far the
signal space is finite.10
To gain intuition for the upcoming results and illustrate the value of benchmarking,
we illustrate few examples.
10 Increasing  the  number  of  intermediate  signals  that  do  not  perfectly  reveal  the  borrower  type  would  make  the
information asymmetry friction costlier to resolve but would not otherwise affect the results. If there were uncountable
measure of signals, having access to many borrowers would not eliminate the information asymmetry. However, even
in that case benchmarking and comparing would be valuable.
)( 2sgp
( )22,ssvR
( )2svR
( )ssv
2t
( )22,ssgp
( )2sv
2=NV
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· Variation of signals across sectors: Financial ratios reveal valuable information to investors,
but a part of this information is sector-specific. What is regarded as a good ratio of asset
turnover, administration costs, gross profit or solvency will vary across industries. Thus,
even when the financial ratios of a sector are fixed in time, the critical values of financial
ratios differ across sectors. Hence, if an investor who has no previous experience in the
sector evaluates a firm, the firm’s financial ratios do not reveal its true financial condition to
the investor. To evaluate the firm properly, the investor must compare the financial ratios of
the  firm  with  the  financial  ratios  of  the  other  firms  in  the  very  same  sector.  Only  after
studying sufficiently many firms, will the investor understand the correct meaning of
financial ratios in the sector.
· Variation of signals over time: The investor may have previous experience in the sector, but
the signal value fluctuates over time, making the information value of a single signal
modest. For instance, a good firm might earn handsome profits if the industry is booming or
moderate profits if the industry is in recession, whereas a bad firm might earn moderate
profits during a boom or fail in a recession. Hence, whether moderate profit indicates a good
or a bad firm would depend on the stage of the industry cycle. Without comparing, the
investor might make a wrong decision by granting a loan to a bad firm with moderate
profits.
· Variation of signals across regions: Production costs and market potential differ from one
region  to  another.  The  same  wage  cost  per  employee,  for  example,  may  indicate  a  good,
efficient firm in Area A, or a bad, inefficient firm in Area B. To be able to evaluate the
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competitiveness of a firm in its local region, the investor needs to compare the firm's
characteristics with its local competitors.
· Variation of signals in research and development: The progress of research and development
is stochastic almost by definition. At first glance, the prototype of an entrepreneur may seem
to be promising. However, careful comparison with the other entrepreneurs' prototypes or
products in the sector may reveal that the prototype is lagging. Financing the first
entrepreneur is likely to be a mistake since its product will hardly be commercially viable.
· Variation of signals according to the industry dynamics. Multiple equilibria are pervasive in
network industries. A network firm's profit may be negative, but contrasting the firm with
other firms in the industry may reveal that the firms are engaged in fierce competition for
dominance where all firms are making losses, and that the firm is leading the competition
for a dominant position in the market. Once in the dominant position, the firm will be able to
raise its price and make substantial profits. Denying the firm finance would probably be a
mistake.
· The profitability of a firm varies with the industry equilibria. Efficient firms may, for
example, earn supernormal profits if the firms in an industry collude and moderate profits if
they compete. Less efficient firms may earn moderate profits if the industry is in collusion
or zero profits if there is competition. Moderate profits may signal an efficient firm if the
firms compete or an inefficient firm in case of collusion.
· Technological cycles change the meanings of signals. The propensity to patent changes over
time depending on the legal and technological environment. For example, it is known that
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innovations can come in waves: after a breakthrough invention it is easier to make follow up
innovations. A successful innovative firm may possess dozens of patents after a
breakthrough, having had only a handful before. A less innovative firm, having struggled to
obtain one patent before the breakthrough, may easily obtain a handful of patents after the
breakthrough. For an outsider, it is hard to know whether a handful of patents indicates an
innovative or an unsuccessful firm.
4. Benchmarking and comparing with N loan applicants
So far we have assumed that the investor can contact at most two firms.Although a complete
characterization of a more general case with an arbitrary number of entrepreneurs is beyond the
scope  of  this  study,  in  this  section  we  briefly  confirm  that  the  insights  gained  from  the  two
entrepreneur case apply for a larger pool of loan applicants.
We first note that incomplete information can be eliminated with certainty when the
number of contacted entrepreneurs approaches infinity. Recall that incomplete information obtains
only if the investor receives signal s2. Consequently, when the number of compared entrepreneurs
grows, incomplete information still obtains after n contacts only with probability
nn ghgh )1()1( -+- . With probability 1-h the state is low and with probability ng  the investor has
contacted only good entrepreneurs. With probabilities h and ng)1( - the state is high and the
investor has compared only bad entrepreneurs. Because probabilities ng  and ng)1( -  are
decreasing in n, the probability that incomplete information obtains approaches zero, when ¥®n .
Even  if  the  investor  has  not  received  two  different  signals  over  the  first n contacts,
comparing can in practice render the deficiency of information insignificant. To see this, consider
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contacting the nth entrepreneur that yields, like all previous n-1 contacts, signal 2s . The probability
that the entrepreneur is good is ( ) nn
n
n ghgh
ghSgp
)1()1(
)1(
,2 -+-
-
=  or
( )
n
n
gh
h
Sgp
)11(
1
1
1
,2
-
-
+
= . (12)
where [ ]nn sssS ,22,21,2,2 ,...,,=  is the vector of signals 2s  received from n entrepreneurs. From (12) it
is evident that if 2
1<g , the probability that signal 2s  indicates a good entrepreneur is decreasing
in n. Similarly, if 21>g , the probability that entrepreneurs with 2s  are good is increasing in n. In
the limit when n  approaches infinity, incomplete informational is removed with certainty: If
2
1<g , ( ) 0lim , =¥>- ngn Sgp , and if 21>g , ( ) 1lim , =¥>- ngn Sgp .
The above discussion dismisses the costs of contacting. If the investor contacts n
entrepreneurs, the total cost of contacting amounts to cn .. To investigate the investor’s optimal
choice of how much to invest in information gathering, taking into account the costs, we write the
initial value of a loan analogously to (11) as
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) csvghsvghghrYhgV NNN ---+-+-+-= )(11)(11 32 , (13)
where subscript N denotes the total number of entrepreneurs. The first term in the right-hand side of
(13) captures the possibility that the first signal is 1s , prompting the investor grant a loan
immediately. The second and third term arise from the cases where the first signal is 2s  or 3s .
The first signal is 3s . As discussed in the previous section, if the first signal is 3s , the
investor knows that the entrepreneur is bad with certainty. This can be used as a benchmark so that
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if the second entrepreneur releases 2s , the investor can eliminate incomplete information by
comparing signals. If the second signal is also 3s , the investor does not lend and may or may not
continue contacting. Thus the value of a loan when there are N potential entrepreneurs and when the
first signal is 3s  can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,,1)(max 333 ssvgcrYgsvN -+--= , (14)
where ( )33 , ssv  is  the value of a loan after two observations of 3s . Note that ( )33 , ssv  cannot be
negative, as the investor can always decide not to grant a loan at all. Since also crYg -- )( >0 by
(1), the investor continues comparing if the first signal is 3s .Because the investor's problem is
stationary, we can easily solve (14) recursively. This yields
( ) [ ] ( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é --
--=
-
g
gcrYgsv
N
N
1
3
11)( . (15)
In words, if the first signal is 3s , the investor continues contacting and comparing the entrepreneurs
until she encounters signal 2s . The value of the loan is increasing in the total number of
entrepreneurs in the economy, since it becomes increasingly likely that the investor will find a good
entrepreneur and can grant a loan.
The first signal is 2s . As in section 3, if the first signal is 2s , and the second signal is
different (either 1s or 3s ), incomplete information is eliminated and the investor can make an
optimal lending decision. However, if the second signal is also 2s , the investor can update her
priors. Subsequently, the investor can grant a loan to either of the entrepreneurs releasing signal 2s ,
she can decide to exit the credit market without lending, or she can proceed to compare a third loan
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applicant. If she takes the last option, she will be in a similar but not identical position as after the
second contact: either the incomplete information is eliminated or she can update her beliefs.
In general, after the investor has encountered n-1 entrepreneurs who have emitted 2s ,
the value of a loan can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }cSvtrYtSvSv nnnnRn --+-= -- ,21,21,2 1,max (16)
where ( ) ( ){ }0,max 1.21,2 rYSgpSv nnR -= --  is the value of a loan under uncertainty after n-1
2s signals and where ( ) ( )[ ]( )gShpgShpt nnn --+= -- 11 1,21,2  is the probability that incomplete
information will be eliminated by the nth contact. Here
( ) ( )1,211
1
1,2 1)1()1(
)1(
---
-
- -=-+-
-
= nnn
n
n Sgpghgh
ghShp  is  the  conditional  probability  that  the  state  is
high when all n-1 previous signals are 2s .
The value of the loan (16) could be solved backwards, beginning with the termination
payoff ( ) ( ){ }0,max .2,2 rYSgpSv NNR -= . Because the problem is non-stationary, however, solving
(16) completely is a messy exercise and does not yield substantial insights. Nonetheless, a few
general results can be obtained from (16). The first of them is proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. If the net present value of a loan under uncertainty is negative ( ( ) 02 £svR ) and
the prior probability that a loan applicant has a good project is less than one half ( 21<g ), the
investor continues to contact and compare new loan applicants until the problem of incomplete
information is eliminated.
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To understand Proposition 3, recall from (12) that ( )nSgp ,2  is decreasing in n when 21<g . Thus, if
granting a loan to the first entrepreneur signalling 2s  is unprofitable ( ( ) rYsgp <2 ), it will remain
unprofitable for all subsequent entrepreneurs with 2s . It also turns out that an exit, yielding zero
payoff, is not optimal if 21<g . In the case of 21<g the probability that a new contact eliminates
incomplete information exceeds g  and, thus the expected return from each new contact exceeds
0)( >-- crYg (recall (1)). The investor thus compares entrepreneurs until incomplete information
is eliminated. Under the parameter values of Case 1 of Table 1, the investor operates as predicted by
Proposition 3.
If 21>g , the investor's behaviour is different. In such circumstance the optimal
number of comparisons is always finite, as verified by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If 21>g , the investor stops comparing new loan applicants even if incomplete
information remains.
We give a heuristic argument here (the formal proof is in Appendix C). On the one hand, ( )nSgp ,2
is increasing in n by (12), if 21>g . The probability approaches unity when n  is large enough, and
the expected return from a loan under uncertainty, ( ) rYSgp n -,2 , approaches rY - . On the other
hand, the expected return from contacting a new loan applicant is always lower than crY -- .
Thus, when n  is large enough, the investor prefers granting a loan under uncertainty to contacting
and comparing a new loan applicant, and the number of compared loan applicants is finite.
An implication of Proposition 4 is that it can be optimal to grant a loan already to the
first entrepreneur even if uncertainty about his type remains, as in the two-entrepreneur economy of
section 3.3. It is easy to see that such a lending strategy is optimal if the first loan applicant is good
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with a sufficiently high probability or if the contacting is sufficiently costly. For example, this
investment strategy is optimal under the parameter values of Case 2 in Table 1.
5. Multiple investors and financial intermediation
Sections 3 and 4 show how making benchmarks and comparisons is beneficial even if there is only
one investor in the credit market. If there are multiple investors, however, an arrangement wherein
each investor separately collects information has many shortcomings: If an investor contacts one
loan applicant and receives 2s , the investor operates under incomplete information. The investor
can gather more information by using the first signal as a benchmark and comparing signals from
subsequent loan applicants with it. But this is costly. Each investor needs to contact several loan
applicants even if each investor has only a unit of capital and she can grant only one loan. Each loan
applicant is then contacted several times although each time the monitoring provides the very same
information. Moreover, an investor cannot be sure ex ante that comparing several entrepreneurs will
eliminate  incomplete  information.  In  this  section  we  show  how  investors  can  overcome  these
shortcomings by establishing a coalition, financial intermediary as in Boyd & Prescott (1986) and
Diamond (1984).
For brevity, we focus on the case where there are equally many entrepreneurs and
investors. Suppose that an investor establishes a financial intermediary, invests her endowment in it
as equity capital. The other investors deposit their savings in the intermediary, which promises to
pay fixed interest Dr  on  deposits.  The  owner  of  the  intermediary  then  operates  as  a  banker
contacting loan applicants and monitoring them on the behalf of the other investors. When each
investor invests her endowment in the bank and when the banker monitors each loan applicant of
the economy, each loan applicant is monitored once and only once.
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As the financial intermediary grows, it becomes increasingly likely that the banker
contacts two different types of loan applicants, which eliminates incomplete information. Even if all
its loan applicants are similar, the banker becomes increasingly confident about the true state of the
world and types of its loan applicants. In the limit, when the financial intermediary is sufficiently
large, the incomplete information will be eliminated with certainty (Proposition 3), and the number
of monitored loan applicants is equal to the units of the funds invested. To put it differently, a
sufficiently large financial intermediary achieves the very same optimal solution that is achieved
under perfect information. A conclusion follows:
Proposition 5. If the investors join together and establish a financial intermediary, each loan
applicant is contacted only once and the duplication of information provision cost is avoided. When
the intermediary is sufficiently large, incomplete information will be removed with certainty.
This result resembles that of Diamond (1984). In both models, a financial intermediary is bank-like
and eliminates the duplication of information provision, thereby cutting the costs of lending.
Nonetheless, the models differ in some important aspects: In Diamond (1984), centralised
information provision is profitable, since a single investor can finance only a small fraction of a
project. Thus many investors are needed to finance the whole project. If each investor monitored the
project, the cost of monitoring would be duplicated. The duplication can be eliminated by
establishing a financial intermediary, which monitors the project only once. On the contrary, in our
model, centralised information provision is profitable even if a single investor finances the whole
project. Although a single investor finances only one project, she should contact numerous loan
applicants to gather information. With multiple investors, the same loan applicants would be
contacted by several investors and the cost of contacting would be duplicated. Useless duplication
can be avoided by establishing a centralised intermediary, which contacts each loan applicant only
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once. In our case centralisation also removes incomplete information whereas in Diamond (1984)
centralisation yields no informational advantages beyond economising the monitoring costs.
Pushing the argument for centralised financial intermediation to the limit, we can also
determine the deposit rate in the credit market. Let P  denote the total profit of the intermediary. If
the intermediary has N investors (as well as loan applicants), PN1  is  the  profit  share  of  a  single
investor.
Remark. A sufficiently large intermediary can pay to an investor-member a fixed return, of
crggYr NND --+=Pº ¥® )1(lim
1 .
The result follows from the law of large numbers and it utilises the idea of Diamond (1984). We can
also interpret rD as the deposit interest rate for the credit market. At the beginning of period, each
investor deposits her unit in the intermediary, which invests a share g  of the funds in good projects
and puts the rest in the outside option. At the end of the period, the loans yield a net return of
)( cgYN -  and the outside option yields N(1-g)r. The intermediary can then pay a return of rD per
deposit unit and the banker also obtains return rD on his investment. From the assumed market
structure, it follows that investors gain the full project surplus, whereas entrepreneurs earn zero
profit.
Note that, in equilibrium, there is no incentive problem between the banker and the
depositors. Suppose that the banker misbehaves and contacts only a fraction a  of the loan
applicants.  In  this  way she  can  not  only  save  the  costs  of  contacting cN)1( a-  but  also  invest  a
fraction N)1( a-  of the intermediary's funds in the outside option. The intermediary's net revenue –
the banker’s income - is at most (when the banker has contacted sufficiently many loan applicants
to be able to interpret the signals correctly)
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[ ]{ }0,)1()1()1( DB rNNrrggYNMax ---+-+= aap (17)
Since the intermediary is very large, the realised fractions of different asset types are fixed owing to
the law of large numbers. In (17) gNYa  represents lending returns from the contacted loan
applicants who proved to be good. The rest of the contacted loan applicants proved to be bad and a
fraction Nrg)1( -a  of the funds were allocated in the outside option. The funds saved from
N)1( a-  loan applicants that were not contacted yield Nr)1( a-  when invested in the outside
option. Finally, DrN )1( -  denotes payments on deposits. After some manipulation using the
definition of rD given by the Remark, (17) can be rewritten as
[ ]{ }0,)()1( crYgNNcrMax D ----+ aa (18)
The banker incurs the opportunity cost of the equity capital invested in the financial intermediary,
rD, and the (non-monetary) costs of contacting, Nca , which implies that the bank's revenue should
be at least NcrD a+  to cover the banker's costs. Since [ ]crYgN ---- )()1( a  is negative in (18)
(recall (1)), the banker can obtain NcrD a+  only if 1=a . That is, the banker optimally contacts
and monitors all entrepreneurs. Just as in Diamond (1984) the incentive problem between the bank
and its depositors is eliminated thanks to the law of the large numbers. Furthermore, the banker’s
income is subordinated to payments on deposits.
Finally, note that investors have no incentive to form an intermediary to gain market
power, since by assumption they can extract all the surplus from entrepreneurs. The tendency
towards centralised financial intermediation arises solely from economics of scale in comparing.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we study benchmarking and comparing as a source of information in financial markets.
Making benchmarks and comparing others with it amount to a simple instrument of learning. It has
many features common with other forms of learning such as learning by doing, experimentation and
imitation. The other forms of learning, however, require many observations on the same
entrepreneur over time whereas comparing exploits the differences between entrepreneurs. We
show how incomplete information can be reduced by making benchmarks and comparisons. By
comparing sufficiently many entrepreneurs, an investor can separate good from bad loan applicants.
If every investor invests in information gathering, it will be inefficient, since loan
applicants  are  compared  several  times  with  zero  information  gain.  To  prevent  the  useless
duplication of comparing, the investors optimally join together and establish a financial
intermediary, which contacts each loan applicant only once. If the intermediary can grow without
bound, the problem of incomplete information can be eliminated with certainty without further
investment in information acquisition. This provides a novel rationale for centralised financial
intermediation.
An implication of our model is that financial institutions such as banks can become
dominant financiers of an industry by exploiting scale economies in comparing. Once a bank has
gathered information about firms in the industry by comparing them, it is difficult for new financial
institutions to enter the market for finance of the industry. The entrants should start the process of
comparing from the beginning whereas the incumbents know the firms and the signals. Thus, even
if the incumbents and entrants observe the same information, the incumbents may have an
information advantage since they are able to interpret the information correctly. Only in new
industries, will old and new financiers compete on equal footing. In such circumstances the efficient
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use of benchmarks and comparisons can be the crucial determinant of financial institutions'
successes and failures.
Indeed, although we have emphasised the role of comparing in credit markets and that
the intermediary arising from our analysis is bank-like, comparing is perhaps even more relevant for
business angels, venture capitalists and other entities that focus on financing new high-tech
industries. As carefully documented by Gompers and Lerner (2004), such private equity financiers
frequently encounter ideas for businesses in areas where there is little available information. The
lack  of  track  records  for  applicants  or  business  area  does  not  lead  to  the  collapse  of  markets  for
innovation finance, since financiers seek many applications from the same narrow area. In
comparing applications, it becomes evident that funding should be denied to some business ideas.
The most promising projects receive the first stage financing. After a new round of comparing, only
the most successful firm can obtain second stage financing. The next logical step is to endogenise
the form of financial contract so as to enable assessment of the relative benefits of benchmarking
and comparing in private equity and debt finance.
Another interesting issue would be to introduce some tradeoffs to counter the
tendency towards bigger financial intermediaries predicted by our model. For example, investors
should be allowed to go beyond benchmarking and comparing and use other strategies to mitigate
information asymmetry such as estimation of cash flows. That and many other intriguing issues are
left for future work.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of part i): In the proof we use the following observation frequently
( ) ( )22 1)1()1()1(1 ghghggghgh -+-=---+- . (A.1)
Given (3), (6), and (10), it is profitable to contact the second applicant if
( ) ( ) { } { } crYsgpMaxrYssgpMaxtrYt +-³--+- 0,)(0,),(1 22222 (A.2)
33
The inequality is satisfied if rYsgp £)( 2  for sufficiently low c. Hence, we focus on the case
where rYsgp >)( 2 .  There  are  two  possibilities,  depending  on  whether rYssgp -),( 22  is
positive or negative. Using (9), we rewrite ( ) ( )[ ]( )gshpgshpt --+= 11 222  as
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) crYghgh
ghrY
ghgh
gg
+-
-+-
-
³-
-+-
-
11
1
11
1  or, using (A.1), to
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cghghghgYghghr -+-³-+-+- 111)1( 22 . (A.3)
Adding and subtracting ( ) 21 ghY -  in the LHS of (A.3) yields
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cghghgYghghYghghr -+-³-+---+- 11111)1( 222 . (A.4)
Since rYssgp <),( 22  implies ( )[ ]rghghYgh 222 1)1()1( -+-<- , the LHS of (A.4) is positive.
Hence, (A.4) holds if c is sufficiently low.
Now assume rYssgp >),( 22 . Equation (A.2) simplifies to
( )[ ] cssgptsgptY ³-+- ),(1)( 22222 . (A.5)
Since ( )( ) ghgh
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=-  by (A.1), (A.5) can be further simplified to
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which is true if c is sufficiently low.
Proof of part ii): From (A.2) we see that a necessary condition for the optimality of a
loan under uncertainty about the first entrepreneur's type is .0)( 2 >- rYsgp  When
0)( 2 >- rYsgp , (A.2) implies that the loan under uncertainty is optimal if
( ) ( ) { } crYssgpMaxtrYtrYsgp ---+-³- 0,),(1)( 22222 (A.7)
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Because the RHS of (A.7) is smaller than crY -- , a sufficient condition for optimality of the loan
under uncertainty is that the LHS of (A.7) exceed crY -- . As a result, a sufficient condition for
part ii) of Proposition 1 to hold is
( )Ysgpc )(1 2-³ . (A.8)
Condition (A.8) holds if c or )( 2sgp  is sufficiently large. The latter occurs when g is close to one
or h is close to zero (see (9)).
Proof of part iii): If ,0)( 2 <- rYsgp  the investor does not grant a loan to the first
entrepreneur. Thus, if c is so high that (A.2) is violated, the investor does not grant a loan.
QED
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: We show that nn tt <+1  for all n. Rewrite nt  as
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where 11 -= gA . Without loss of generality, we assume that n is continuous. Differentiating (B.1)
gives:
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Step 2: We next verify that gtnn =¥®lim . Using (B.1), it is easy to show that
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Step 3: Since we assume that ( ) rYsgp <2 and since ( )nSgp ,2  is decreasing in n
(recall (12)), ( ) rYSgp n <,2  for all n . Given ( ) rYSgp n <,2 , the value of a loan under uncertainty is
zero for all n, i.e., ( ) 01,2 =-nR Sv . Thus, (16) can be concisely written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }cSvtrYtSv nnnn --+-=- ,21.2 1,0max . (B.4)
If ( )nSv ,2  is  positive  for  all n, the investor will contact and compare loan applicants until she
receives either 1s  or 3s .  The  RHS  of  (B.4)  is  strictly  positive  since gtn >  (steps 1 and 2) and
0)( >-- crYg  by (1). Hence, after contacting the first loan applicant, the investor optimally seeks
the second loan applicant and compares him with the first one, and continues the process until
incomplete information is eliminated. QED
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
If 21>g , ( )nSgp ,2  is increasing in n  and approaches 1 and when n?? (see (12)). Thus, there
exists a ,1<p  such that 0>--=- crYrYp , where the last inequality follows from (1). Let k
denote the smallest number of contacted loan applicants that satisfies pSgp k ³)( ,2 .
Equation (16) implies that the investor contacts a new loan applicant if
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) cSvtrYtSv nnnnR --+-£- ,21,2 1 (C.1)
where ( ) ( ){ }0,max 1.21,2 rYSgpSv nnR -= --  and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }cSvtrYtSvSv nnnnbn --+-= +++ 1,211,2.2 1,max . When kn ³-1 , (C.1) can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) crYSgptrYtrYSgp nnnn ---+-£-- .21.2 1 (C.2)
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because ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) cSvtrYtcrYrYSgprYSgp nnnnn --+->--³->- +++- 1,2111.2.2 1 . Subtracting
crY --  from both sides of (C.2) yields
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )nnn tSgpYcrYrYSgp ---£----- 11 .21.2 . (C.3)
In (C.3) the LHS is positive since kn ³-1 , and the RHS is negative. As a result, the inequality is
not satisfied, and it is not optimal to go on comparing. Thus, the optimal number of compared
entrepreneurs is finite.
QED
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